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Nuclear Safeguards Education Portal
  

Introduction to Nuclear Material Accountancy (cont.)

Rendering harmless the Kalahari test shafts in S. Africa. When S. Africa signed the NPT in 1991, the IAEA General Conference requested that the completeness of the inventory of nuclear installations and material included in S. Africa's initial report to the IAEA be verified. The IAEA concluded that the declared inventory of nuclear installations and material was complete. (Source: IAEA)
Rendering harmless the Kalahari test shafts in S. Africa. When S. Africa signed the NPT in 1991, the IAEA General Conference requested that the completeness of the inventory of nuclear installations and material included in S. Africa's initial report to the IAEA be verified. The IAEA concluded that the declared inventory of nuclear installations and material was complete. (Source: IAEA)  

IAEA Level

Since it is possible that a State could falsely declare their NMA to divert nuclear material for a weapons program, the IAEA must verify the State and facility's NMA declaration.  The IAEA performs its verification process through the following steps:

  • Independently verifying nuclear material accounting information in facility records and State reports , as well as conducting activities as provided for in the safeguards agreement
  • Determining the effectiveness of the SSAC
  • Providing statements to the State on the IAEA's verification activities
  • The IAEA does not maintain the accounting system in a State
  • The IAEA verifies the accuracy of the accounting system
  • This is achieved via random sampling from the inventory as well as other checks

There are five fundamental elements of NMA which the facility, State, and IAEA incorporate:

  1. Establishment of accounting areas
  2. Record keeping
  3. Nuclear material measurement
  4. Preparation and submission of accounting reports
  5. Verification of the correctness of the nuclear material accounting information

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